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INVERSE CONDEMNATION LITIGATION
IN THE 1990s-THE UNCERTAIN LEGACY
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S LUCAS AND
YEE DECISIONS
RICHARD M. FRANK*
"The attempt to determine when regulation goes so far that it be-
comes, literally or figuratively, a 'taking' has been called the 'law-
yer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark.' "
No issue of natural resources law has intrigued and bedeviled the
United States Supreme Court over the past fifteen years more than in-
verse condemnation law.2 During that period, the Court handed down
more than twenty decisions in which the Takings Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments was central
* Supervising Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Justice,
Sacramento, California. Professor of Law, Lincoln Law School, Sacramento,
California. Mr. Frank was counsel of record for the State of California, which appeared
before the United States Supreme Court as amicus curiae in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), and in several other recent inverse
condemnation cases decided by the Court. The views expressed in this article are the
author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Attorney General of the State of
California.
1. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 199, n.17 (1983) (quoting CHARLEs M. HAAR, LAND USE PLAN-
NING 766 (3d ed. 1976)).
2. See infra note 10 for a definition of inverse condemnation law.
3. See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990); Pennell
v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran
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That the Supreme Court devotes this degree of attention to so-called
"takings" jurisprudence is noteworthy given the Court's limited docket
and the multitude of other important legal questions which perpetually
compete for the Justices' attention. One might logically conclude that
the Court's recent, intense scrutiny of takings principles would produce
a well-settled and understandable body of law. In fact, nothing could
be further from the truth.
The Supreme Court decided two important Takings Clause cases in
its 1991-92 Term that perpetuated this exasperating trend.4 Yee v. Es-
condido and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council are a study in
contrasts: Yee was a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court; Lucas
typified the far more common pattern in takings cases of a sharply di-
vided Court. Yee received little attention from the general media; Lu-
cas may well be the most publicized and controversial environmental
decision handed down by the Court in several years.
Yet the two decisions share certain common features. Both Yee and
Lucas purport to create "bright line" rules governing certain regula-
tory takings cases. Any significant level of certainty or stability which
might flow from those rules is, however, likely to prove illusory.
This article focuses on what the Yee and Lucas decisions hold, what
Takings Clause issues they leave unresolved and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, what key inverse condemnation questions are likely to be the
focus of future takings litigation in the muddled wake of Yee and
Lucas.
I. BACKGROUND TAKINGS PRINCIPLES IN A NUTSHELL
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the taking
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1987); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Florida Power Corp., 480
U.S. 245 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); United States v. River-
side Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); United States v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
4. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Yee v. City of
Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
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of private property for public use without just compensation.5 Nearly
a century ago, the Supreme Court held, under the selective incorpora-
tion doctrine and the Fourteenth Amendment, that this "Takings
Clause" or "Just Compensation Clause" of the Fifth Amendment ap-
plies to limit state and local, as well as federal, government action.6
Traditionally, courts construed the Takings Clause to limit only ac-
tual, physical seizures of private property by a governmental entity
without payment of compensation.7 Such seizures could either be per-
formed directly, through the sovereign's exercise of its eminent domain
power,' or indirectly, through actual government occupation of private
property by physical seizure, flooding, or destruction.9 The latter form
of "taking" came to be known as "inverse condemnation." ' Both
types of governmental action qualify as so-called "physical takings"
that require compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Such "physical takings" by the government, to the extent they
are permanent in nature, are compensable "no matter how minute the
intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it
,,II
This per se rule for physical takings contrasts with the amorphous
standards applicable to so-called "regulatory takings." The notion that
government regulations could precipitate a compensable taking did not
develop until the twentieth century. Many commentators trace the
birth of regulatory takings jurisprudence to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes' now-famous opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.12 In
that case, Justice Holmes enunciated the oft-cited maxim that "while
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5.
6. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). See also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW § 11-2, at 772 (2d ed. 1988) (finding that
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process provision incorporates the right to just
compensation).
7. William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985); see also Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2892 (majority opinion), 2914-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the
original narrow scope of the Fifth Amendment taking provision).
8. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 9-2, at 588 n.2, 590.
9. Id. § 9-3, at 592.
10. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.6 (1980) ("Inverse condemna-
tion is 'a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just com-
pensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been
instituted.' ") (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
11. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
12. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking."13
Determining which government regulations go "too far" and thus
require compensation under the Takings Clause is the core issue that
has vexed the Supreme Court, and lower federal and state courts, in the
70 years since Pennsylvania Coal. The Court admitted as much in its
1978 landmark decision Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.14
Eschewing the per se standard embraced in physical takings cases,
the Court traditionally makes an "ad hoc, factual inquiry""5 in adjudi-
cating regulatory takings cases. The Court has not comprehensively
identified the criteria that should be considered in regulatory takings
challenges. The closest the Court has come is the Penn Central deci-
sion, where it identified three seemingly non-exclusive factors relevant
to takings claims: (1) the character of the governmental action being
challenged; (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the property
owner; and (3) the extent to which the regulation "has interfered with
distinct, investment-backed expectations" of the property owner.
1 6
The so-called "nuisance exception" to the Takings Clause is the final
component of the takings doctrine. In a century-long line of cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court had rejected a number of constitutionally-based
claims to compensation, on the ground that the government invoked its
police power to address key public health, safety, and welfare con-
cerns." In those cases, the court deemed the challenged regulation
13. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
14. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The court stated:
The question of what constitutes a [regulatory] 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty .... [Tlhis
Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concen-
trated on a few persons.
Id.
15. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
16. Id.
17. See, eg., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506
(1987) (upholding coal mining subsidence regulation against takings challenge on
grounds that "public purposes" justified the regulation); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272, 280 (1928) (validating a government directive to cut down infected trees considered
a "public nuisance" in order to prevent disease's spread to other properties); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 413 (1915) (upholding state statute requiring closure of
brickyard in urban area on public welfare grounds); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 540 (1914) (upholding miner safety regulation); Mugler v. Kan-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/5
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valid regardless of its economic impact on the affected private prop-
erty.' 8 The rationale for the nuisance exception is that "all property in
this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of
it shall not be injurious to the community."' 9
It is this constitutional conundrum that the Supreme Court revisited
in Yee and Lucas.
II. YEE V. CITY OF EsCoNDIDO
A. Background
Like many of the takings cases accepted for review by the Supreme
Court in recent years, Yee v. City of Escondido20 emanated from the
California state courts. In Yee, mobile home park owners in the San
Diego area claimed that a municipal mobile home rent control ordi-
nance,21 coupled with the requirements of California's Mobilehome
Residency Law,22 resulted in an unconstitutional taking of private
property without compensation under the United States Constitu-
tion.23 The California statute limits park owner's ability to terminate a
mobile homeowner's tenancy 24 or to prevent the tenant from selling or
assigning his or her leasehold interest in the mobile home.25 The Es-
condido rent control ordinance, adopted by voter initiative in 1988,
restricts the park owners' ability to impose rent increases.26
The park owners in Yee argued that the net effect of the two meas-
ures was to: (a) inflate artificially the value of a given mobile home in a
way that primarily, and unfairly, reflected the value of the underlying
real property rather than the mobile home unit itself;27 (b) deprive the
sas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (upholding compelled closure of brewery on grounds that
state may designate alcoholic beverages as public nuisance).
18. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 488, 491-92 (finding that
burdens may be placed on private property to prevent a use which would injure the
community).
19. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. at 665.
20. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
21. ESCONDIDO, CAL., MOBILEHOME RENT CONTROL art. V, § 29-101-108 (1988).
22. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 798-99.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
23. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1527.
24. CAL. CIv. CODE § 798.56 (West Supp. 1992).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798.71-.79 (West 1982 & Supp.).
26. EscONDIDO, CAL., MOBILEHOME RENT CONTROL art. V, § 29-103 (1988).
27. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528.
1993]
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park owners of the use and occupancy of their real property;28 and
(c) grant the tenant and his or her successors in interest the right to
occupy physically and to use the park owners' property indefinitely.29
The park owners' ultimate position was that this resulted in a physi-
cal taking of their property, thus triggering a per se duty of the city to
compensate the park owners under the Takings Clause.30 Their posi-
tion found explicit support in, and was expressly predicated on, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' earlier decision in Hall v. City of Santa
Barbara.31 In Hall, the Ninth Circuit struck down a mobile home rent
control measure similar to Escondido's on the very grounds advanced
by Yee.32 In Hall, the Ninth Circuit found the rent control ordinance
to work an uncompensated taking of the mobile home park owner's
property by applying established "physical takings" standards,33
which, as noted above, are far less exacting than those applied in so-
called "regulatory takings" cases. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently adopted the Hall rule and rationale.34
Conversely, the California state courts had expressly rejected the
reasoning and result in Hall, adhering to the more conventional "regu-
latory takings" analysis and explicitly rejecting the Ninth Circuit's
"physical takings" theory.35 The Supreme Court saw Yee as an oppor-
tunity to resolve this important state-federal judicial conflict in takings
28. Id. at 1527.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1528.
31. 112 S. Ct. at 1527, citing Hall, 833 F.2d 1270, 1281 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that
a local ordinance could effect physical taking of mobile home owners' property), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
32. 833 F.2d at 1280.
33. Id. at 1279-80. See also Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d
575, 588 (9th Cir. 1991) (following Hall and holding that city rent control ordinance's
vacancy control provision took mobile home park owner's property without just com-
pensation), reh'g granted and opinion withdrawn and superseded, 973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir.
1992).
34. See Pinewood Estates v. Barnegat Township Leveling Bd., 898 F.2d 347, 353-54
(3rd Cir. 1990).
35. See Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, 280 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Yee
v. City of Escondido, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), cert. granted in part, 112
S. Ct. 294 (1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); see also Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile
Home Sales, Inc., 546 A.2d 805, 818 (Conn. 1988) (holding that provision permitting
tenants to sell mobile home which comported with regulatory standards did not effect a
physical taking of mobile home owner's private property), appeal dismissed, 489 U.S.
1002 (1989).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/5
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jurisprudence.3 6
B. The Supreme Court Decision in Yee
In Yee, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the City of Escon-
dido's mobile home rent control ordinance against a claim that the pro-
vision resulted in a physical taking of the mobile home park owners'
property. 37 In so doing, the Court rejected the contrary analysis em-
braced by the Third and Ninth Circuits.38 The Justices also took the
opportunity to reiterate some "bright line" distinctions between regula-
tory takings and physical takings. The Supreme Court expressly rebuf-
fed the Ninth Circuit's "physical takings" standard in favor of the
more traditional "regulatory takings" analysis embraced by the Cali-
fornia state courts in Yee 39 and similar cases.4°
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, summarily rejected the
park owners' argument that the Escondido ordinance effected a physi-
cal taking.4 1 Accordingly, the Court held that the rent control ordi-
nance represents only a regulation of the park owner's property, rather
than a physical occupation of the parcel.4 2 In so doing, the Court ex-
36. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1527.
37. Id. at 1531.
38. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for discussion of the Third and
Ninth Circuits' analysis.
39. See supra note 35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the California state
courts' position in Yee.
40. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528.
41. Justice O'Connor stated:
This argument, while perhaps within the scope of our regulatory taking cases, can-
not be squared easily with our cases on physical takings. The government effects a
physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical
occupation of his land ....
But the Escondido rent control ordinance, even when considered in conjunction
with the California Mobile Home Residency Law, authorizes no such thing. Peti-
tioners voluntarily rented their land to mobile home owners .... Put bluntly, no
government has required any physical invasion of petitioners' property. Petition-
ers' tenants were invited by petitioners, not forced upon them by the government.
Id.
42. Id. at 1529. The distinction is critical: alleged regulatory takings are subject to
a weighing and balancing of multifaceted criteria under established Takings Clause ju-
risprudence. In contrast, governmental physical occupations of property are, with rare
exceptions, considered to be per se takings of property for which compensation is consti-
tutionally compelled. See text accompanying supra notes 11, 15-16.
1993]
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pressly repudiated the novel, and contrary, approach embraced by the
federal courts of appeals in Hall and subsequent decisions.
III. LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
A. Background
Lucas involved a challenge to the 1988 South Carolina Beachfront
Management Act.43 The key regulatory constraints of the Act limit
development within critical areas of the beach and dune system by es-
tablishing construction setback requirements" and limiting reconstruc-
tion of dwellings seaward of those setback lines following natural
disasters.4" In the Act, the state declares that the South Carolina
coastal dune and beach system serves a host of indispensable public
purposes. These include protecting life and property by acting as a
storm barrier, providing habitat for endangered species and wildlife
generally, and serving as a basis for a tourism industry essential to
South Carolina's economy.' The Act further declares concern for the
critical erosion of South Carolina's beaches,47 the harm that certain
types of construction causes on the dunes system,4" and the threat that
such ecological damage poses to the above-described public purposes.49
The plaintiff, Lucas, owned two vacant, oceanfront lots located sea-
ward of the statutorily-prescribed setback lines.50 As a result, the Act
precluded Lucas from constructing any permanent structures other
than a small deck or walkway on the lots.5 Lucas sued the state
agency charged with administering the Act, claiming that the Act
worked an unconstitutional taking of his property.52 The trial court
agreed that a taking had occurred because the regulation effectively
eliminated all economic value of the lots and awarded Lucas
$1,232,387.50.53
43. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1992).
44. Id. § 48-39-280.
45. S.C. CODE § 48-39-290 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
46. S.C. CODE § 48-39-250(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
47. Id § 48-39-250(3).
48. Id. § 48-39-250(5), (7).
49. Id. § 48-39-250(11).
50. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
51. Id. at 2889-90 & n.2.
52. Id. at 2890.
53. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/5
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A divided South Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that the Act fell within the scope of the nuisance exception to the com-
pensation requirement of the Takings Clause.54 As noted above, no
unconstitutional taking occurs and no compensation is required when
government acts to prevent private use of property that would cause
public harm." Because it was undisputed that the Act was designed to
prevent "the great public harm" of the erosion and destruction of the
coastal dune and beach system, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that no unconstitutional taking had transpired.56
Justices Harwell and Chandler dissented from the state supreme
court decision in Lucas.57 They adopted the position previously articu-
lated in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis:58 compensation is required whenever landown-
ers are deprived of all economically viable use of their property, regard-
less of how the proposed use of that property harms the public.59 The
dissent also contended that the "quasi-nuisance" exception is inappli-
cable when the regulation at issue furthers public purposes beyond pre-
vention of a private harm."
B. Supreme Court Decision in Lucas
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Lucas, began by finding
that the property owner's takings claim was ripe for adjudication
notwithstanding South Carolina's 1990 enactment of legislative amend-
ments which afforded the landowner some future prospect of develop-
ing his parcels.61 Turning to the merits, the Court held that the South
Carolina Supreme Court had applied the wrong constitutional stan-
dard in ruling for the state of South Carolina.62 Accordingly, the case
54. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899-900 (S.C. 1991),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). See also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text for a
delineation of the scope of the public nuisance exception.
55. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490-91
(1987) (elucidating the evolution of the noxious use and public nuisance exception).
56. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898, 901.
57. Id. at 902-08 (Harwell and Chandler, JJ., dissenting).
58. 480 U.S. 470, 506-21 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
59. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 906.
60. Id.
61. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2890-92.
62. Id. at 2901.
1993]
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was reversed and remanded for further state court proceedings to de-
termine whether an unconstitutional taking had in fact occurred.63
The more interesting and, ultimately, significant aspects of the Lucas
decision are how the Court reached the conclusion that the state
supreme court had erred, and how it fashioned the new takings test for
those relatively rare situations" when government regulation results in
total elimination of a property's economic value, a "total taking." The
majority in Lucas established a presumption that, in such circum-
stances, a compensable taking does exist.
66
As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, and despite the majority's
implications to the contrary, the Supreme Court had never previously
adopted such a sweeping rule.67  Indeed, the Court's prior takings
precedents include numerous cases in which the court rejected com-
pensation claims despite a regulation's perceived elimination of all pri-
vate use of property.
68
Justice Scalia's majority opinion did indicate, however, that the pre-
sumption of a taking has limits. The Court held that government regu-
lation of real property that totally eliminates economic use will survive
63. Id. at 2901-02. The Court expressly declined to decide whether an unconstitu-
tional taking actually had occurred. Id. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme
Court subsequently found a taking to have transpired and returned the case to the trial
court solely for purposes of computing the appropriate amount of damages. Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 1992 WL 358097 (S.C. 1992).
64. Id. at 2894.
65. Id. at 2893-95.
66. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895. The court concluded this portion of its decision with
the following pronouncement:
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief
that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economi-
cally beneficial use in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
Id.
67. Id. at 2918-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2910-12 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (finding that "[w]hen the government regulation prevents the owner from
any economically valuable use of his property, the private interest is unquestionably
substantial, but we have never before held that no public interest can outweigh it.").
68. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 332-33 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (noting that
precedent holds that not every diminution in a property's value is compensable); Gold-
blatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (finding that a regulation which prevents
the beneficial use of property is not unconstitutional when the regulation is a valid exer-
cise of municipal police powers); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (holding
valid a regulation which did not compensate owners for the value of property but rather
destroyed or decreased the market value of the property).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/5
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a takings challenge in at least two related circumstances.69 The first
involves proposed uses of private property which contravene tradi-
tional notions and limitations found in state property law.70 Under
this rationale, for example, a property owner whose development pro-
posal is rejected by government regulators on the ground that the
owner previously conveyed an open space easement for the parcel to
third parties would lack a viable takings claim under Lucas.7 1
The second, more controversial limitation on the Court's "total tak-
ing" rule relates to the "nuisance exception ' 72 relied upon below by the
South Carolina Supreme Court. The majority in Lucas retained the
nuisance exception but circumscribed its future application and use.73
Scalia's majority opinion found that a regulation which is necessary to
forestall "grave threats to the lives and property of others" 74 will pass
constitutional muster even if the regulation's impact is to eliminate to-
tally the value of affected private property.75 In so holding, Scalia
69. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
70. Id. at 2901. The majority explained as follows:
In light of our traditional resort to 'existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law' to define the range of interests that qualify
for protection as 'property' under the Fifth (and Fourteenth) amendments, this
recognition that the Takings Clause does not require compensation when an owner
is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by those 'existing rules or
understandings' is surely unexceptional.
Id.
71. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), rev.
granted, 315 Or. 271 (1992), decided only a month after Lucas, also demonstrates the
application of this rationale. Stevens involved an inverse condemnation challenge to the
city's denial of a permit to build a seawall which would have facilitated plaintiffs' con-
struction of a beachfront hotel. Id. at 941. The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the
takings challenge, finding that under Lucas the plaintiffs lacked a property-based right
to build the seawall on the dry sand beach area owned by plaintiff. Id. The court held
that the public previously acquired the right to use the dry sand area under the Oregon
state law doctrine of "custom." Id. at 942. Accordingly, the court concluded, "the
purportedly taken property interest was not part of plaintiffs' estate to begin with." Id.
at 9423 citing State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969).
72. See supra notes 17-19 for a discussion of the nuisance exception.
73. Justice Scalia examined the nuisance cases, see supra note 17, and, without re-
versing any of them, seemingly limited their precedential value. 112 S. Ct. at 2896-99.
74. 112 S. Ct. at 2900, n.16.
75. Id. at 2900-01 & n.16. Cf. id. at 2903-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)
("The Supreme Court of South Carolina erred, in my view, by reciting the general pur-
poses for which the state regulations were enacted without a determination that they
were in accord with the owner's reasonable expectations and therefore sufficient to sup-
port a severe restriction on specific parcels of property.").
1993]
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clearly intended to narrow the scope of the nuisance exception beyond
that stated in prior Supreme Court decisions.
One of the most notable passages from the majority opinion in Lucas
is the Court's fashioning of a new, multifaceted constitutional test
which lower state and federal courts must now use to assess the appli-
cability of the nuisance exception as part of the required "'total taking'
inquiry."76 The relevant factors include the following:
The degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent pri-
vate property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities, the so-
cial value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to the
locality in question, and the relative ease with which the alleged
harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and
the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike.7 7
Justice Scalia added a final restriction to both exceptions to the "to-
tal taking" presumption: any restriction based on nuisance or state
property law limitations must be justified by land use limitations of the
type recognized under pre-existing state property law.78 He stated that
"[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (with-
out compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership. ' 79 The Court also opined that the
application of state nuisance or property law principles to defeat a tak-
ings claim must be "objectively reasonable."'
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.8" Kennedy disagreed
with the majority regarding the Court's newly-circumscribed nuisance
exception.82 He reasoned that the contours of the nuisance exception
76. 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 2900.
79. Id. This passage seems to imply that such restrictions must be creatures of
common, i.e., judge-made, law rather than legislation and predicated on well-settled
state property and nuisance rules. Yet later in the opinion, Justice Scalia appears to
draw back from this absolutist view, noting that "changed circumstances or new knowl-
edge may make what was previously permissible no longer so." Id. at 2901 citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 827 cmt. g (1979).
80. 112 S. Ct. at 2902, n.18.
81. Id. at 2902-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
82. d. at 2903.
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should be flexible and expansive in allowing police power regulations."
Kennedy concluded that the correct standard by which to judge regu-
lations that eliminate all property value is "whether the deprivation is
contrary to [the property owner's] reasonable, investment-backed
expectations.
' ' s4
Justice Souter wrote a separate statement, finding the writ of certio-
rari improvidently granted and advocating the dismissal of the writ. 5
Souter predicated this result on the fact that the Court granted the
petition for review under the mistaken belief that the Beachfront Man-
agement Act deprived Lucas of all beneficial use of his property.
86
Souter found insufficient evidence in the record to indicate whether the
regulation effected a total taking and the probability that in fact no
such taking had occurred precluded the Court's consideration of
whether a taking had actually occurred. 7
Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote lengthy dissents. 8  Each
Justice took issue with the Court's threshold conclusion that Lucas'
takings challenge was ripe for adjudication 9 and with the majority's
substantive takings analysis.' ° Regarding the latter, Justices Blackmun
and Stevens disagreed with the majority's interpretation of historic tak-
ings precedents, 9 with the categorical presumption of a taking in cases
where all economic value is lost,92 and with the scope of the nuisance
83. Id.
84. Id. Kennedy believed that this test permits the reasoned coexistence of the tak-
ings clause and local police powers. Id.
85. 112 S. Ct. at 2925 (Souter, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id. Souter stated:
While the issue of what constitutes total deprivation deserves the Court's attention,
as does the relationship between nuisance abatement and such total deprivation,
the Court should confront these matters directly. Because it can [not] do so in this
case ... the Court should dismiss the instant writ and await an opportunity to face
the total deprivation question squarely.
d. at 2926.
88. See 112 S. Ct. at 2904-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 112 S. Ct. at 2917-25 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2906-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2917-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. See 112 S. Ct. at 2904-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2919-25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
91. Id. at 2910-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2914-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2910-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2920-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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and state property law exceptions articulated by the majority.93
IV. INVERSE CONDEMNATION IN THE POST-LUCAS AND YEE ERA
- WHERE Do WE (AND THE COURTS) GO FROM HERE?
For a number of reasons, the short-term impacts of Yee and Lucas
should be relatively limited. First, the Court effectively remanded both
cases to their respective state courts for further proceedings. In Yee,
the Court vitiated the landowners' physical takings challenge to the
rent control ordinance at issue.94 Yet the Court repeatedly indicated
that the property owners' takings claim might be viable in a regulatory
takings context.95 Similarly, the Court in Lucas remanded the case to
the state court for further proceedings, expressly declining to deter-
mine whether a taking had transpired on the facts presented.96
Second, both Yee and Lucas involved atypical factual situations
which are not likely to recur with any frequency. Yee concerned the
unique interrelationship between a local rent control ordinance and a
California statute governing mobile home occupation. Lucas involved
what the Court perceived as the somewhat Draconian effect of a state-
wide beachfront setback requirement that eliminated all economic use
of the landowner's parcels. Most coastal states have coastal planning
and development programs which treat development applications on a
case-by-case rather than statewide basis.97
93. 112 S. Ct. at 2912-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2920-22 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
94. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1529-31.
95. Id. at 1528, 1530-31. Apparently, Mr. and Mrs. Yee took the Court at its word.
News accounts report that the couple refiled their takings challenge to the Escondido
ordinance the day after the Supreme Court handed down its decision. See "Losing
attorneys in 'Yee' case take court's advice, file new suit," Sacramento Daily Recorder,
April 8, 1992, at p. 1, col. 1. The new complaint, contrary to the original version, relied
on a purely regulatory taking theory. The court subsequently dismissed the amended
complaint on res judicata grounds because the plaintiffs had raised, but not pursued,
their regulatory takings claim in the original proceeding. Telephone Interview with
Jeffrey Epp, counsel of record for respondent City of Escondido (Oct. 3, 1992).
96. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02; see also supra note 63.
97. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 46.40.100 (1991) (permitting variances from district
coastal management programs and review of denials by state superior courts); CAL.
PuB. RES. CODE §§ 30600-627 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) (requiring permit application
for all coastal development from individual owners and allowing review of decisions on
permits); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-109 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992) (providing for
filing and review of coastal site plan for each proposed coastline structure); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-5-237 to 12-5-247 (Michie 1992) (outlining the development permit applica-
tion and review process); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, § 40 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp.
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Third, Justice Scalia was undoubtedly correct when he repeatedly
characterized government regulations which totally eliminate the eco-
nomic value of real property as unusual.98 The far more common situ-
ation involves a regulation which arguably diminishes, but does not
eliminate, the economic worth of property. Nothing in the Lucas deci-
sion overtly says that the traditional ad hoc balancing approach used in
Penn Central and other prior regulatory takings cases should not cease
to be applied in the latter situation.9 9
While the immediate effects of the Yee and Lucas decisions are rela-
tively insignificant, the more subtle long-term implications of the deci-
sions are likely to have a substantial impact on courts and litigants. Of
the two opinions, Lucas seems more pivotal."°°
A. The Erosion of Ripeness Principles?
Both Yee and Lucas eroded previously-settled principles governing
ripeness of takings claims for judicial resolution. The Supreme Court
had previously developed a series of formidable procedural barriers to
judicial resolution of takings claims.' Among them are requirements
that, before filing a takings claim in the courts, property owners must:
1992) (same); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 34-0109, 34-0112 (Consol. 1992)
(same); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 28.2-1406 to 28.2-1415 (Michie 1992) (same).
In 1990, South Carolina amended the Beachfront Management Act at issue in Lucas
to incorporate a variance procedure that might well allow Mr. Lucas to build on his
oceanfront lots. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890-91, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
98. See 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (finding that the doctrine that a taking occurs when a
regulation eliminates all property value only applies "to the relatively rare situations
where the government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses.").
99. See 112 S. Ct. at 2925 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting the continuing viability of
the Court's regulatory takings precedent).
100. Many of the key themes of Lucas were unnecessary to the Court's ultimate
disposition of the case and are therefore dicta. The majority of this dicta is in the foot-
notes to Justice Scalia's majority opinion. See, e.g., 112 S. Ct. at 2892-93 nn.3-5 (ripe-
ness); id. at 2894 n.7 (valuation of "taken" property); id. at 2898 n.11-12 (interpretation
of legislative intent); id. at 2900 n.16 (definition of cognizable nuisances).
101. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-
52 (1986) (noting that the Court historically insists on knowing the "nature and extent"
of statutorily permitted development before determining whether the statute effects a
taking); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-97 (1985) (outlining the numerous prudential barriers to judicial
resolution of taking claims); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating
that controversy may not be ripe unless landowner actually applies for development
permit).
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(1) obtain a final judicial determination regarding the challenged mea-
sure's applicability to the subject property; (2) pursue at least one
meaningful attempt to obtain an administrative variance or similar ex-
emption from the regulation; and (3) avail themselves of reasonably
available state compensation procedures.10 2
These ripeness principles indisputably pertain to "as-applied" tak-
ings challenges, concerning a regulation's effect as applied to a particu-
lar piece of property. It has been less clear whether so-called "facial"
challenges to a regulation, which claim that a measure effects an un-
constitutional deprivation of property on its face, without reference to
a given factual setting, were subject to the same ripeness defenses.1 3
In Yee, the Supreme Court found the ripeness doctrine somewhat inap-
plicable to facial takings challenges. 1°4
The Court's language may help resolve the confusion over the extent
to which ripeness principles apply to facial takings cases. Previously,
the Court has admonished that facial takings claims are particularly
difficult to prove.10 5 However, this aspect of Yee may encourage some
property owners to forego as-applied takings claims in favor of facial
attacks because the latter are, post-Yee, largely exempt from the strin-
gent ripeness requirements that the Court has mandated for as-applied
102. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985).
103. Compare Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 505-
07 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that facial takings claim is unripe until the property owner
has determined what compensation is available), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991) with
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 938 F.2d
153, 156-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that plaintiffs need not attempt to amend their
development plan to overcome ripeness bar to adjudication).
104. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1532. Addressing the city's threshold argument that peti-
tioners' regulatory takings claim was unripe, Justice O'Connor concluded:
While... a claim that the ordinance effects a regulatory takings as applied to
petitioners' property would be unripe [because the landowner had not sought ad-
ministrative relief in the form of rent increases], petitioners mount a facial chal-
lenge to the ordinance .... As this allegation does not depend on the extent to
which petitioners are deprived of the economic use of their particular pieces of
property or the extent to which these particular petitioners are compensated, peti-
tioners' facial challenge is ripe.
Id. (citations omitted)
105. See, eg., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987) (finding that property owners "face an uphill battle in making a facial attack on
the Act as a taking because of the high burdens of proof they face."). The Keystone
decision contains good discussion of the key differences between facial and as-applied
takings cases. Id. at 493-96.
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takings cases. 06
Lucas represents an even more fundamental reordering of ripeness
principles. Traditionally, courts have viewed ripeness as a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite.1 "7 That characterization has important conse-
quences. For example, a court could raise jurisdictional defects sua
sponte. Further, ripeness, like other facets of federal subject matter
jurisdiction, traditionally has been seen as a non-waivable defect which
can be raised for the first time even on appeal.
The majority opinion in Lucas, however, seems to transform ripe-
ness principles from a jurisdictional prerequisite to a purely discretion-
ary doctrine. Justice Scalia's opinion on this point 0" is replete with
language of judicial weighing and balancing; Scalia ultimately declined
to adopt South Carolina's ripeness defense for the simple reason that
the state courts previously had refused to do so.1"9 The majority con-
cluded with the following statement: "for the reasons discussed we do
not think it prudent to apply that prudential [ripeness] requirement
here." 110
It appears that a majority of the Court no longer views the ripeness
106. The same point is made in Lucas, albeit in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opin-
ion: "Facial challenges are ripe when [an] Act is passed; applied challenges require a
final decision on the Act's application to the property in question." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2907, n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348,
351-53 (1986) (requiring a final determination of what development is permitted before
considering a regulation's constitutionality); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[r]ipeness is more than a mere
procedural question; it is determinative of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382
(1991); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1456-57, modified, 830 F.2d 968
(9th Cir. 1987) (finding lack of ripeness because landowners failed to get final determi-
nation of damages available under inverse condemnation claim), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1043 (1988).
108. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890-92.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2892. Justice Kennedy's concurrence takes the same view: "There ex-
ists no jurisdictional bar to our disposition, and prudential considerations ought not to
militate against it." Id. at 2902 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgement). Justice Ste-
vens agreed in his dissent that ripeness requirements did not impose a jurisdictional bar
in Lucas: "It is true, as the Court notes, that the argument against deciding the consti-
tutional issue in this case rests on prudential considerations rather than a want of juris-
diction." Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, Stevens went on to criticize the
Court for its failure to exercise "judicial restraint" and its insistence on reaching the
merits of the case. Id. Only Justice Blackmun's dissent adhered to the traditional view
that ripeness in takings cases is a rule of jurisdiction, rather than a matter of judicial
discretion. Id. at 2906-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
102 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 43:85
doctrine as a necessary prerequisite to the courts' subject matter juris-
diction, but rather as a jurisprudential standard to be invoked if and
when the facts warrant. This reformulation of ripeness principles con-
fers the doctrine with a status akin to that of abstention principles in
the federal courts."' As a result of Yee and Lucas, the courts will
adjudicate more takings claims on their merits rather than on the
threshold procedural ground of ripeness.
B. The "Denominator" Issue: What is the Relevant Parcel?
The threshold issue of determining the relevant parcel of land a reg-
ulation effects is deceptively complex. A simple example frames the
issue. Assume a property owner owns three rural, ten acre parcels.
One of those parcels consists of nine acres of developable uplands and
one acre of fragile wetlands. Assume further that the landowner seeks
to develop solely the one-acre portion of that ten-acre parcel, but a
regulating entity refuses to permit development on grounds that the
development would destroy a pristine marsh the government seeks to
maintain as open space and wildlife habitat. The owner subsequently
sues in inverse condemnation alleging a taking. What is the relevant
parcel, or "denominator," for the court to assess in determining the
economic impact and other relevant takings factors concerning the
challenged permit decision? The one acre of wetlands? The entire ten-
acre parcel? Or the aggregate thirty acres of the three plots which
plaintiff owns?
To a considerable degree, the answer to this question dictates
whether a taking has transpired. If, for example, the relevant parcel
for purposes of determining a regulation's economic impact is the sin-
gle acre of wetlands, a court would likely find a total or near total
elimination of all economic use. 12 On the other hand, if the court
examines the full ten-acre parcel, the regulation merely diminishes the
value of the overall parcel and thus triggers the Court's traditional,
111. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (West
4th ed. 1983) (discussing abstention doctrines). See also Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76
(1982) (finding that standing to sue principles implicate both Article III principles and
discretionary jurisprudential considerations).
112. Construing the denominator in this fashion would trigger the categorical pre-
sumption announced in Lucas that regulations effect a compensable taking in far more
cases than the "rare" or "extraordinary" situation contemplated in the Lucas decision.
See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95; see also supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the majority's "total" takings doctrine.
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multi-faceted balancing analysis.11 The likelihood of the property
owner prevailing in his or her takings claim is correspondingly and
dramatically reduced. If the Court views all three parcels as the rele-
vant denominator, the plaintiff has an even further reduced chance of
winning. 14 The Court in Lucas spotlighted, but did not decide, this
issue. 116
Federal and state courts are hopelessly split on the denominator is-
sue. The Supreme Court itself has sent mixed signals on the ques-
tion."' Lower federal courts 18 and the state courts also have
113. See, eg., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977)
(finding that determination of whether taking has occurred depends "upon the particu-
lar circumstances" of each case).
114. In Lucas, Justice Scalia took pains to discredit the latter theory, criticizing the
state court decision in Penn Central that found no taking based on this analysis. Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2894, n.7 (discussing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 103, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883
(1978). However, this discussion is dictum.
115. Since the record before the Court in Lucas reflected a finding of total elimina-
tion of the subject property's value, discussion of the "denominator" issue in the deci-
sion is pure dictum. Yet the fact that Justice Scalia felt compelled to raise the issue and
that four other Justices joined in the opinion suggests that the Court is concerned with
this aspect of takings law.
116. Id. at 2894 n.7. In a lengthy footnote, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
observes:
[The Court's takings jurisprudence] does not make clear the 'property interest'
against which the loss of value is to be measured .... Unsurprisingly, this uncer-
tainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction
has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court. [Citations omitted.] The
answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations
have been shaped by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree
the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular in-
terest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or
elimination of) value.
Id. (citations omitted).
117. Compare the discussion from Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894, n.7, with the following
excerpt from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978):
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole....
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
118. See, eg., American Say. and Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364,
372 (9th Cir. 1981) (imposing upon landowner the burden of proof as to whether tracts
of land should be analyzed as separate parcels); Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F. Supp.
1195, 1204-05 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (following Penn Central to find that entire subject prop-
erty should be examined in determining whether regulation effected taking); Formanek
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struggled with the problem.119 Future cases may seize upon Justice
Scalia's proposed "reasonable expectations" criterion"2 as a way out
of this analytical thicket. However, that proffered test lacks exactitude
and predictability.
In the meantime, regulators may refrain from lot splits, phased unit
developments, or other actions which could give official credence to a
decreased denominator, thereby exposing government to heightened li-
ability under the Takings Clause. Conversely, as Justice Stevens noted,
developers and investors may market specialized estates to take advan-
tage of the Court's new rule. The smaller the estate, the more likely
that a regulatory change will effect a total taking.1 21 In any event, the
"denominator" issue promises to be one of the next "hot spots" in reg-
ulatory takings law.
C. A Physical Taking Is a Physical Taking Is a Physical Taking
Or Is It?
In Yee the Supreme Court seemed intent on establishing a bright-
line rule applicable in "physical takings" cases and on quashing future
attempts by litigants and lower courts to import regulatory takings
principles into physical takings jurisprudence. Resigned to the fact
that regulatory takings law is convoluted to the point of opacity, the
Court appeared determined to keep physical takings law relatively
straightforward. 12 2
Yee accordingly, provides some welcome clarification in physical
v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 335 (Cl. Ct. 1992) (finding no formula for deciding
when a taking occurs and favoring a case-by-case assessment of property values);
Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318-20 (Cl. Ct. 1991) (focusing taking inquiry
on entire parcel of land, not just regulated portion); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 155 (Cl. Ct. 1990) (appeal pending) (making ad hoc valuation
inquiry); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193-94 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (evalu-
ating worth of entire parcel of which regulation took twenty percent), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1017 (1982).
119. See Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 197
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 805 (1983); American Dredging Co. v.
Department of Envtl. Quality, 404 A.2d 42, 43-44 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1979)
(evaluating entire tract for takings review).
120. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
121. Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. At the outset of her opinion for the Court in Yee, Justice O'Connor observed
that: "[A physical takings] case requires courts to apply a clear rule; [a regulatory tak-
ings claim] necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and eco-
nomic effects of government actions." Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526.
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takings law. It firmly reestablishes the analytical distinction between
physical and regulatory takings that some lower federal courts-and
several property rights advocates-tried to blur in previous cases.' 23
However, government regulators should not take too much comfort
from the Yee decision. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion repeatedly
and expressly leaves open the possibility that local rent control ordi-
nances like the one at issue in Yee are vulnerable to traditional regula-
tory takings challenges. 124  As noted above, property owners will
simply restyle their physical takings claims as regulatory takings chal-
lenges and proceed anew. 12' The net effect is not likely to be less in-
verse condemnation litigation, but rather a similar or expanded
number of cases in which the plaintiffs pursue the same factual griev-
ances in a different analytical format.
Moreover, the line between physical and regulatory takings remains
unclear. Yee certainly will not eliminate the possibility of confusion
over whether the per se rule of physical takings rather than the ad hoc
regulatory takings analysis applies to a given property rights contro-
versy. Illustrations appear both in the Court's own prior decisions and
in takings cases currently pending in the lower courts.
For example, the Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States 12 6
treated the federal government's conditioning of a marina permit upon
the private owner's agreement to open the area to the public as a physi-
cal taking.' 27 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,128 the
Court gave lip service to the concept that a similar public access condi-
tion should-as in Kaiser Aetna-be viewed as a physical takings
123. See, e.g., Pinewood Estates v. Barnegat Township Leveling Bd., 898 F.2d 347,
351-53 (3rd Cir. 1990) (applying physical takings analysis to complaint alleging regula-
tory taking).
124. See 112 S. Ct. at 1528 ("The government effects a physical taking only where it
requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land."); Id. at 1530
(distinguishing between physical and regulatory takings analysis). Justices Blackmun
and Souter wrote a short concurring opinion where they expressly declined to join this
dictum. Id. at 1534-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 1535 (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment). Ultimately, the Court in Yee refused to consider the park
owners' regulatory takings claim, because it was not squarely presented in their petition
for certiorari. Id. at 1534. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court: "We leave the regu-
latory taking issue for the California courts to address in the first instance." Id.
125. See supra note 94 (discussing Yee plaintiffs' refiling of suit on regulatory taking
grounds after adjudication by Supreme Court).
126. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
127. Id. at 177-80.
128. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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case.129 Yet in Nollan, the Court analyzed the case primarily in terms
of regulatory takings principles. 130
Other land use controversies even more dramatically demonstrate
the sometimes tenuous distinction between physical and regulatory
takings claims. Consider, for example, property exactions and in-lieu
fees. In many states, developers who seek project approvals must dedi-
cate the land necessary for infrastructure improvements attendant to
the proposed development.131 Is an inverse condemnation challenge to
such an exaction scheme a regulatory or physical takings case? Does
the analysis vary if, instead of dedicating land in the project area, the
developer must provide a comparable amount of off-site property?
And does the analysis shift from a physical to regulatory taking if the
government compels the developer to pay in-lieu fees instead of actu-
ally dedicating land for public use?132
The Supreme Court used Yee to draw a bright-line distinction be-
tween physical and regulatory takings. Whether Yee will actually end
the confusion between the two categories of inverse condemnation
claims is debatable.'33
D. Land is Special-and So Are the Rules
The adage that real property is unique is certainly true when it
comes to inverse condemnation law. The Takings Clause, however,
129. Id. at 831-32.
130. Id. at 834-37.
131. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606,
616-17 (Cal. 1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); see also Potomac Greens
Assocs. Partnership v. City Council of City of Alexandria, 761 F. Supp. 416, 422 (E.D.
Va. 1991) (limiting extent of parking garage to protect groundwater upheld as permissi-
ble exercise of municipal authority); cf. Furey v. City of Sacramento, 780 F.2d 1448,
1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding constitutional a local ordinance requiring developer either
to dedicate land or pay in-lieu fees).
132. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872,
876 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding constitutional under regulatory takings analysis fee pay-
ments to provide housing for development workers), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997
(1992); Blue Jeans Equities W. v. City of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 117-18
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (applying regulatory takings tests to ordinance requiring develop-
ers to pay fees to offset costs of increased transit expenses), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 191
(1992).
133. Despite Yee, some inverse condemnation plaintiffs persist in attempts to graft
various physical takings principles onto regulatory takings law. See, e.g., Patrick Media
Group, Inc. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836-40 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (rejecting claim that special accrual standards for statutes of limitations applica-
ble to physical takings claims should also apply to regulatory takings cases).
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makes no distinction between real and personal property. The
Supreme Court's takings precedents include several decisions involving
personal property.
134
Justice Scalia has for some time implied in his opinions that constitu-
tional law does, or at least should, afford special protection to the pri-
vate ownership and use of real property.13 1 Until Lucas, Scalia had
never explicitly opined that the takings analysis applicable to real prop-
erty-related claims should be different from and more exacting than
that relevant to personal property claims. In Lucas, however, Scalia
emphasized the property owners' more limited expectations regarding
personal property.' 36 He suggested that this is true because of "the
State's traditionally high degree of control over commercial deal-
ings. '  Accordingly, Scalia held that personal property owners
"ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even
render [their] property economically worthless." '138 The majority opin-
ion in Lucas further distinguished real and personal property owner-
ship. With respect to land regulation, government's power to enact
regulations which eliminate all economic value is far more
circumscribed. 139
134. See generally Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (AFDC benefits); Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade secrets); Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (interest earned on interpleader fund);
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (bird artifacts).
135. Justice Scalia's early dissents suggest as much. See, eg., Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 19-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (scrutinizing rent regulation al-
leged to effect taking of landlord's real property); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock do., 480 U.S. 572, 612-14 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (limiting use of state envi-
ronmental control regulation). Justice Scalia struck the same note when he authored
the Court's opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See
483 U.S. at 833-34, 839 n.6 (finding "a right to exclude others from one's property" and
rejecting asserted governmental purposes which interfered with such right). See also
Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867, 884-86,
919 (1970).
136. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2900.
137. Id. at 2899.
138. Id. The majority in Lucas also suggested that while generally applicable gov-
ernment regulations which destroy the value of land might pass constitutional muster,
measures directed specifically and exclusively at land use would be subject to a more
exacting constitutional standard. Id. at 2899, n.14.
139. Id. at 2900. The court stated:
In the case of land, however, we think the notion pressed by [South Carolina] that
title is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subse-
quently eliminate all economically viable use is inconsistent with the historical
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Past Supreme Court decisions implicitly afforded real property
higher protection vis-a-vis the Takings Clause than that given to per-
sonal property rights." Lucas formalizes that "two-track" regulatory
takings analysis and makes takings jurisprudence that much more ob-
tuse. The majority opinion in Lucas strongly suggests that the "total
takings" presumption, that a taking has transpired where a regulation
effectively deprives an owner of substantially all economic use of her
real property, is inapplicable to inverse condemnation claims with re-
spect to personal property interests. A less exacting, pre-Lucas consti-
tutional standard will likely continue to be applied in the latter
instance.
E. Development: Privilege or Right?
Traditionally, the premise of land use law was the largely implicit
assumption that land development is a benefit conferred by the govern-
ment, not an intrinsic personal right.14 The notion that property own-
ership involves a "bundle" of rights, of which the opportunity to
develop is but one, is a closely related traditional maxim. 4 2
Both philosophies appear somewhat obsolete in the post-Lucas era.
Justice Scalia began eroding the former principle in his majority opin-
ion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission:143 "[T]he right to
compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture.
Id.
140. In two recent cases, government regulation prevented the owner from plienat-
ing his property. In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987), the Court found that a
federal statute which absolutely prevented Native Americans from devising fractional
interests in tribal land violated the Fifth Amendment. An earlier case, Andrus v. Al-
lard, 444 U.S. 51, 53-54 (1979), involved a federal statute which proscribed the commer-
cial transfer of bird artifacts. There the Court rejected the owner's inverse
condemnation claim, stating that "loss of future profits - unaccompanied by any phys-
ical property restriction - provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim."
Id. at 66.
141. See, eg., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926)
("[The village's] governing authorities, presumably representing a majority of its in-
habitants and voicing their will, have determined.. . that the course of such develop-
ment shall proceed within definitely fixed lines.").
142. See, eg., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978) (explaining that the Court considers regulation's effects on a parcel of land when
adjudicating a takings case); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (finding that
abrogation of a single property right does not amount to a taking because the Court
views property rights in the aggregate).
143. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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build on one's own property--even though its exercise can be subjected
to legitimate permitting requirements-cannot remotely be described
as a 'governmental benefit.' ",4 He repeated this theme in Lucas. The
strongest statement of this philosophy is found in the following pas-
sage: "[O]ur prior takings cases evince an abiding concern for the pro-
ductive use of, and economic investment in, land. ... .145
This perspective lacks any substantial recognition of the constitu-
tional significance of non-developmental property rights,146 the focus
of several recent Supreme Court decisions.147 Indeed, one of Justice
Stevens' most persuasive criticisms of the majority opinion in Lucas
focuses on this omission. 148
The Lucas majority's philosophy on this point evinces a more utilita-
rian, development-oriented philosophy toward land use than that
demonstrated in earlier Supreme Court precedents. It will be most in-
teresting to see whether this more utilitarian, economics-driven philos-
ophy will eclipse the conservationist, multiple-use ethic articulated in
some of the Court's earlier decisions.149
144. Id. at 834 n.2.
145. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
146. The Court, in response to Justice Stevens' dissent, paid lip service to
noneconomic interests in land. Id. The Court cited Loretto, a physical takings case, in
support of this point. Id.
147. See, eg., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (right to possess and devise
property); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (right to exclude others);
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (same).
148. "This highlights a fundamental weakness in the Court's analysis: its failure to
explain why only the impairment of'economically beneficial or productive use' [citation
omitted] of property is relevant in takings analysis .... [Tihe Court offers no basis for
its assumption that the only uses of property cognizant under the Constitution are de-
velopmental uses." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919, n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Much of Justice Scalia's jurisprudential philosophy towards environmental law
- and many other legal fields - appears to be heavily influenced by the so-called
"Chicago School" ofjurisprudence. That view holds that free market economic princi-
ples can and should be applied in resolving legal disputes to a far greater degree than
has traditionally been the case. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF LAW (3rd ed. 1986). For a specific application of these principles to real prop-
erty law and the Takings Clause, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). In recent years, Justice
Scalia in particular has applied economic principles to resolve a wide variety of ques-
tions coming before the Court. See, eg., City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638
(1992) (rejecting application of multiplier to enhance attorney's fees awardable under
federal fee-shifting statutes).
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F. What Does "Economic Use" Mean, Anyway?
This raises the related question of the appropriate constitutional
standard in regulating takings analysis. The Supreme Court has been
notoriously slipshod regarding this key question. Before Lucas and
Yee, the most oft-recited formulation of the relevant criteria was that
announced in the Court's 1977 decision in Penn Central: "The eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant . . . , the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations [and] the character of the governmental action."' 150 The
Court alternatively stated the standard as whether a given regulation
"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land ....
In Lucas, the Court opted for the latter formulation with respect to
cases presenting a "total" regulatory taking.1 52 But the majority did so
with a seeming disregard for linguistic precision. Justice Scalia did not
hew precisely to the Agins v. Tiburon "denies an owner economically
viable use of his land" formulation; instead, he used a variety of terms
throughout the majority decision. Operative phrases include "all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of land,""'3 "deprivation of ben-
eficial use;"'154 "preventing developmental uses; ' 155 "sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is,
to leave his property economically idle;"' 56 "deprives land of all eco-
nomically beneficial use;"' 57 "eliminate all economically valuable
use;"'158 and "all economically productive or beneficial uses of land."' 159
150. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. See also supra note 16 and accompanying text
for the Penn Central test. The Court approved the multifaceted Penn Central formula
in a number of subsequent regulatory takings cases. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S.
587, 606 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986).
151. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citations omitted). Subse-
quent Supreme Court takings decisions have quoted and relied upon the Agins formula-
tion. See, eg., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)
(determining validity of limitations on use of private property which substantially fur-
ther legitimate government interests).
152. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
153. Id. at 2893.
154. Id. at 2894.
155. Id. at 2895.
156. Id.
157. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
158. Id. at 2900.
159. Id. at 2901.
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It is unclear whether the Court intended these somewhat disparate
phrases to be interchangeable. For a Court which generally places
great importance on legal precision, plain meaning and strict construc-
tion, the answer to this question is surprisingly, and uncomfortably,
uncertain. The Court's primary purpose is to provide clear guidance to
lower federal and state courts on key constitutional questions; this in-
tellectual sloppiness or deliberate obfuscation is less than helpful.
G. The End of Judicial Deference in Takings Cases
Judicial deference to administrative decision-making is a fundamen-
tal precept of judicial review. The judiciary's oft-stated reluctance to
second-guess agency expertise and the harsh reality of crowded court
dockets provide the basis for this longstanding principle." 6 Courts
regularly and explicitly decline to act as super-zoning boards. 161 Now-
established principles of judicial review, such as the substantial evi-
dence standard and the abuse of discretion rules, have arisen from this
philosophy.1 62 With some exceptions, the Supreme Court has vocally
propounded this philosophy.1 63
That level of judicial restraint generally extends to the Court's exam-
ination of constitutional questions. Because the Court does not view
Fifth Amendment property rights cases as dealing with "fundamental"
constitutional rights,'" the generally-applicable standard of review is
whether a particular governmental regulation is rationally related to a
160. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.1 (3rd ed.
1984).
161. Williams v. City of Columbia, 906 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir. 1990) (discouraging
zoning variance applicants from filing suit in federal court on grounds that such actions
would have the effect of "converting federal courts into super-zoning boards"); Ras-
kiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (Ist Cir. 1985) (finding that federal
review should not be readily granted where the state offers administrative and judicial
remedies for the controversy), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985); Barnes County v. Gar-
rison Diversion Conservancy Dist., 312 N.W.2d 20, 25 (N.D. 1981) ("It is not the func-
tion of the judiciary to act as a super board, substituting its judgment for that of the
administrator whose decision is being reviewed.").
162. SCHWARTZ, supra note 160, § 10.1.
163. See, eg., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) ("The fundamental policy questions appropri-
ately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not subject to re-examination
in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action.").
164. See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 77 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (finding that a more liberal test applies in evaluating property
cases than in cases involving personal liberty interests).
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legitimate governmental purpose.165 This standard seems to be of pro-
gressively declining relevance in inverse condemnation cases. Lucas
continues the recent Supreme Court trend of giving short shrift to leg-
islative findings in land use takings litigation in favor of exacting judi-
cial scrutiny of a challenged regulation's actual effect upon a property
owner.
Justice Scalia's earlier opinions reveal considerable skepticism to-
ward government findings and justifications for land use decisions that
hamper private property rights. 66 That philosophy bore full flower in
Lucas. The Court's opinion gives little credence to the legislative find-
ings upon which South Carolina sought to justify its beachfront devel-
opment restrictions. 167 The Court's decision thus reflects more interest
in a land use measure's actual impact on private property than the gov-
ernment's stated justification for the regulation, or identification of the
ills the measure is intended to address. 168
The Supreme Court may be moving toward-or have already
reached-a sort of "intermediate scrutiny" standard for Takings
Clause litigation. That standard is less exacting than the "compelling
state interest" test the Court utilizes in fundamental rights cases. But
the new takings test is certainly more difficult for government to meet
than the rational relationship standard the Court traditionally applies
in assessing the constitutionality of other types of economic regulation,
including land use measures challenged under the Takings Clause.169
The "burden of proof" in takings cases seems to be shifting-de jure
or de facto-from the property owner to the government defendant. 17
While the plaintiff clearly retains the threshold obligation to prove the
165. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see generally TRIBE,
supra note 6, § 8-7 (discussing the Court's reluctance to interfere in economic
regulations).
166. See, eg., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (de-
manding demonstration of a substantial government objective "where the actual con-
veyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction.").
167. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-98 & nn.11-12.
168. This may simply reflect the current Court's greater interest in the "economic
impact" criterion of traditional takings analysis than in the "character of the govern-
mental action" component - at least in the case of a "total taking." See generally Penn
Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
169. This may be analogous to the "intermediate scrutiny" standard the Court has
recently fashioned in certain equal protection cases. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 16-24
(discussing the intermediate scrutiny standard as applied to illegitimacy discrimination).
170. The dissenters in Lucas recognized and criticized this shift in the applicable
standard of judicial review. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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economic loss occasioned by the regulation,17 1 as well as the nature
and scope of the private property interest claimed, there no longer ap-
pears to be a presumption of constitutionality. Thus, the government
bears at least partial responsibility to prove the legality of its actions.
This may prove to be the most enduring legacy of Lucas.
H. The Amorphous Parameters of the State Property Law and
Nuisance Exceptions
Perhaps no facet of the Court's Lucas opinion is so controversial, so
important, and so likely to spawn future takings controversies as the
majority's discussion of the state property law and nuisance exceptions
to the Takings Clause's compensation requirement. Unfortunately,
this portion of the Lucas decision is oblique and obscure.1 72
It seems apparent that Justice Scalia intended to narrow the scope of
the so-called "nuisance exception" which the Court reaffirmed as re-
cently as 1987 in Keystone.' 7 The Court neither overruled nor even
criticized its earlier opinion in Keystone, however. This will undoubt-
edly produce confusion for lower courts and litigants in future cases.
More notable is the likely impact of the Court's declaration in Lucas
that reliance on property or nuisance law principles to overcome a total
takings claim "must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance al-
ready place upon land ownership."' 74 The majority repeatedly stressed
that those restrictions must rest on state common law principles, rather
than legislation. 
175
These statements will likely result in the Balkanization of takings
jurisprudence. With respect to government defenses to claims of a to-
tal taking, reviewing courts must refer to and rely upon property and
nuisance principles of the particular state where the claim arises. 17 6
171. Id. at 2893 n.6.
172. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Richard M. Frank, Regulating
Land and Resources in the Post-Lucas Era: The Impact of California's Nuisance and
Real Property Law, in LAND USE FORUM (Continuing Education of the Bar, forthcom-
ing Winter 1993).
173. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92
(1985). Keystone was a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Jus-
tice Powell, and Justice O'Connor dissenting.
174. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
175. Id. at 2900-01.
176. Courts will probably utilize this analysis in adjudicating "partial" takings
claims where it is claimed that government regulation reduces, but does not eliminate,
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Accordingly, fifty separate bodies of takings law will develop across the
nation. Given the dissimilarities in nuisance and other property law
principles among the states, the disparities in resulting inverse condem-
nation decisions are likely to be great.
Compounding the confusion is Justice Scalia's explicit embrace of
certain specific criteria for adjudicating the validity of government reli-
ance on the nuisance defense. 177 While the opinion suggests that state
nuisance law "ordinarily entail[s]" application of the criteria that
Scalia cites, 178 the majority simultaneously recognizes the diversity of
state law approaches to the subject. 17 9 The reconciliation of these prin-
ciples, and the degree to which common law nuisance principles have
now been "constitutionalized," is unclear.
The Lucas opinion exhibits other uncertainties in this area. What
constitutes a "background" principle of state nuisance and property
law for purposes of takings analysis? One firmly established when a
given state was admitted to the Union? Or one articulated by the state
courts at the turn of this century? One articulated a decade ago? And
does the answer to this question depend on whether the state in which
the takings claim arises is Alaska rather than Delaware?
Further, what is one to make of Justice Scalia's oblique acknowl-
edgement that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make
what was previously permissible no longer so. . . ,,?11o This language
seems inconsistent with Scalia's earlier-stated reliance on long-settled
nuisance and property law concepts.' 8 ' How the lower courts can rec-
oncile these seemingly disparate passages from this key portion of the
Lucas opinion is problematic.
A final uncertainty involves the circumscribed role of legislative bod-
ies in identifying and addressing hazards to public health, safety, and
welfare occasioned by various uses of private property. Lucas dictates
that state and local lawmakers cannot develop new legal theories to
justify restrictions on private property use that would otherwise effect a
the value of private property. However, the majority opinion is not explicit on this
point.
177. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia's explanation of
the proper application of the nuisance doctrine).
178. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 827 cmt. g. (1977)).
181. See supra note 179.
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taking.182 But what of the more likely situation where the legislature
passes a statute or ordinance that merely codifies longstanding com-
mon law principles?1"3 Is such legislation wholly irrelevant to takings
analysis? If not, how should the courts view it?
A central shortcoming of this portion of the Court's analysis is that
state property law-and especially common law nuisance principles-
continually evolves to reflect social changes, technological advances,
and newly-discovered hazards. Freezing state law property and nui-
sance principles at some indeterminate date in the past-as the Lucas
majority may be dictating-ignores this ineluctable fact."'
I. Procedural Implications of Lucas and Yee
The important procedural implications of Lucas and Yee should not
be overlooked. First, these decisions, especially Lucas, will undoubt-
edly spawn additional regulatory takings litigation against federal,
182. 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
183. For example, California courts repeatedly characterize state legislation which
creates detailed coastal development permit and planning programs as simply represent-
ing an exercise of government's traditional power to regulate nuisances. See Leslie Salt
Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 200 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583-584
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984); CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 118
Cal. Rptr. 315, 323-324 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
184. The Lucas majority's conclusion on this point drew criticism from the other
Justices. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy observed:
The common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory
power in a complex and interdependent society. The State should not be prevented
from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions ....
The Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law ....
112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, 3., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun was
even more blunt in dissent, stating: "There is nothing magical in the reasoning of
judges long dead." Id. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Many commentators criticize this aspect of the Court's decision:
[The] new rule allows government to regulate if it follows common-law notions of
harm set out by judges 200 years ago but prevents today's legislators and judges,
operating with new information and better scientific understanding of environmen-
tal risks, from making their own judgment about what uses of property are harmful
to neighbors and common resources .... Scalia's opinion invites a constant stream
of court challenges about whether modem regulations on wetlands, coastal protec-
tion, endangered species and forest management comport with common-law under-
standings of how property use can be restricted. It's good for lawyers, but it will
unduly hamper government as it struggles to keep communities safe and the envi-
ronment livable.
Editorial, "Scalia's 18th century world," SACRAMENro BEE, July 6, 1992, p. B12, col.
1.
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state, and local governments."' 5 This is true for two principal reasons.
First, the Court's newly-articulated, fact-specific regulatory takings
standard will require case-by-case adjudication. Second, Lucas contin-
ues a Supreme Court trend of giving short shrift to legislative findings
in land use takings cases in favor of judicial scrutiny of a challenged
regulation's actual effect upon a property owner.18
6
These factors also suggest that a growing number of such inverse
condemnation actions will not be susceptible to resolution by pretrial
motions, as has traditionally been the case. Takings claims and adjudi-
cations will more likely require a full adjudication on the merits be-
cause of the demise of threshold procedural defenses such as statute of
limitations and ripeness. The increased burden on crowded state and
federal court dockets will be significant.
If past experience is any guide, many property owners will press
their takings claims in the federal, as opposed to state, courts. Owners
predicate this preference on: (1) a belief that federal judges are more
sensitive to alleged state intrusions on federally-conferred constitu-
tional rights than their state brethren; and (2) the fact that, from the
property owner's standpoint, the most favorable inverse condemnation
decisions emanate from the federal courts. 1
87
Yet regulatory takings cases filed in federal court against state and
local governments are not likely to stay there. Ripeness principles al-
low federal courts to avoid deciding many regulatory takings cases on
their merits: both Yee and Lucas signal a change in that trend.'
185. While Yee will discourage physical takings claims, that decision implies that
regulatory takings claims of the type advanced in Lucas should meet with considerably
greater success. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing Yee's poten-
tial impact). If past experience is any guide, plaintiffs will assert the latter form of
inverse condemnation claim with respect to a wide, sometimes novel, array of claimed
property interests. See, eg., Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(holding that Government's retention of former President's presidential papers effects a
Fifth Amendment taking of private property).
186. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text for discussion of this aspect of
Lucas.
187. The United States Claims Court and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
spearheaded the latter trend. See, eg., Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the EPA's placement of groundwater wells or private
property to mitigate groundwater pollution from nearby toxic waste site effected a tak-
ing); Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 335-40 (Ct. Cl. 1992) (ruling that
denial of development permit for purely private property constituted a taking).
188. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text for analysis of the effects of Yee
and Lucas on ripeness principles.
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However, many federal courts may invoke the abstention doctrine, en-
suring that state courts adjudicate such takings claims, 18 9 because Lu-
cas compels a court to examine and apply state common law principles.
Federal judges may be uncomfortable addressing those issues in the
first instance. Accordingly, and predictably, federal judges will exer-
cise their discretion and decline federal court jurisdiction over those
cases in favor of state court adjudication, using abstention as the proce-
dural means to that end.
I. CONCLUSION
The short-term impact of Yee and Lucas should be minimal. Both
cases dealt with relatively unusual factual situations that should not
recur with any great frequency. Neither case can accurately be de-
scribed as a clear-cut "win" for either private property rights or advo-
cates of government regulation.
The enduring legacy of the opinions rests on the broad themes they
strike, and in the new course they set for inverse condemnation law.
Lucas in particular evinces heightened sensitivity to private property
rights, and increased skepticism towards government's professed justi-
fications for police power measures that affect such rights.
One can confidently predict that the legacy of Yee and Lucas will be
more, not less, regulatory takings litigation. Most plaintiffs will wind
up pursuing their claims in the state courts. Pretrial motions will re-
solve relatively few takings claims because of the detailed, fact-specific
inquiry now mandated by the Court.
Far less certain is how state and federal courts will strike the sub-
stantive balance between private property rights and government's ex-
ercise of the police power. Again, Lucas in particular identifies key
sub-issues of takings jurisprudence, such as the "denominator issue,"
the proper meaning of "economic use," and the scope of the state nui-
sance and property law exception without resolving them."9°
189. Cf In re Eastport Associates v. City of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1071, 1075-77
(9th Cir. 1991). For a detailed discussion of federal court abstention principles, see
W1GHT, supra note 111, § 52.
190. The first reported inverse condemnation decisions handed down after Yee and
Lucas bear witness to the limited precedential value of those cases. For example, in
Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals expressly refrained from issuing its opinion until the Supreme Court issued its
Lucas decision. Id. at 1134. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals proceeded to ignore the
Lucas decision, articulating its own, multifaceted criteria that the court believed essen-
tial to a proper takings analysis. Id. at 1136. These criteria go beyond those identified
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Takings jurisprudence was a muddle before the Supreme Court
handed down Yee and Lucas, and a muddle it remains. In theory, the
Supreme Court should provide clear guidance and direction to lower
courts, litigants and the public regarding important constitutional
questions. The Court's failure to realize those critical objectives with
respect to recent Takings Clause jurisprudence represents a desultory
legacy.
in Lucas or, indeed, any previous Supreme Court decision. Id. See also Wilson v. Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, 597 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Mass. 1992) (finding that Lucas did
not assist in the resolution of the question whether government may bar property use
which harms state and adjoining owners' interests).
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